

COMMODIFICATION OF THE ACT OF DEFENDING ISLAM FILM 212 THE POWER OF LOVE

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ABSTRACT. This research aimed to picture a religion commodification using a film. The case study chose the 212 Act of Defending Islam represented by film 212 The Power of Love. It was interesting to observe as an Islamic film among other same kind of movies from the political of economy perspective, especially from the commodification process. That film was produced in taking the opportunity of market (its spectator) from mass mobilizing space in the real act that brought the religious and political issue at once. 212 The Power of Love gained nearly 400 thousands spectators, although its production side claimed reaching 700 thousands. That achievement didn't come near to the real act mass - whom purposed to jail DKI governor Basuki Tjahja Purnama or Ahok of religion defamation - that claimed to reach 7 millions participants. But that film production continued to its sequel and prequel, showed that the business potential from the process of Act of Defending Islam issue exploitation considered potential for its creator thus it depicted a process - which Vincent Mosco mentioned as - content commodification and audience commodification.

KEYWORDS: commodification, Islam, 212, Act of Defending Islam, film

1 INTRODUCTION

Religion-themed films generally reflect two things. First, that he always represented religious views that were influenced by the social and political influences of his time. Second, the potential use of the audience through reading of religious tendencies or religious views at that time. In Indonesia, the national films of the Era Orde Baru were born as a response from and for the enthusiasm of the audience for the change in the nation state to be better, independent and prosperous. Films with religious themes at that time were then born by taking into account the trends or perspectives of religion in society. National films with religious themes tend to avoid issues that are considered contrary to the religious views of the rulers. Or, a perspective that would provoke the authorities to act represents a certain religious point of view.

After the Orde Baru, Indonesian religious films picked up various themes that could not be separated from the existing socio-religious landscape. But at the same time, the 'control' of the film shows a tendency to shift from the rulers to certain religious groups. As explained by Nugroho and Herlina (2013) film and religion synergize sweetly, but produce bitter stories of violence. Radical Islamic groups are trying to take a position in politics after being suppressed for a long time during the Orde Baru era. The mode of control is shown through demonstrations, lawsuits to the courts to strong statements from religious leaders who are considered role models.

One thing that is interesting, films are born out of a general reading of the general tendency of a completely liquid mass. However, certain films are made with a reading of certain market segments that are formed in such a way because of a certain religious movement or political movement. G30S/PKI (1984), emerged during the period of mobilization of hatred and anti-PKI by the Orde Baru. At that time, even the audience was mobilized, among others by making the film a must-see for students in almost all parts of the country.

This film by director Arifin C Noer spent a budget of Rp 800 million, in 1984 it broke the Jakarta audience record based on Kompas Daily data (31/12/1984). December 1984 DKI Jakarta attracted 699,282 spectators. This number surpassed the 1982 top box office, namely Nyi Blorong

which scored an audience of 354,790 viewers. Of course, one of the reasons is that this film was a must-watch in the Suharto era, and was even screened for 13 years—between the 1980s and 1997—each before the commemoration of the 30 September Pancasila Sanctity Day (<https://www.kompas.com/2019/09/30>). At that time, the G30S/PKI was not released through normal commercial channels. Partly because PPFN didn't want to risk its commercial failure and the significance of public sluggishness. Instead, once again, this film is required to be screened in schools and government departments. It is the most broadcast Indonesian film and if the ratings on September 30, 1997 are to be believed, it is also, almost without a doubt, the most watched Indonesian film (Sen and Hill, 2001: 172).

In the context of the market, of course, no work is born without calculating the audience's share or segment. But after the G30S/PKI, almost no films were made using mobilization or, for example, certain tendencies of mass psychology that could be read clearly through the mass media. Besides that, there is no fixed formula to ensure a film will sell well or be watched by whom. Even the increasing number of film productions does not automatically increase the number of viewers (<https://lokadata.id>).

It is in this context that we can see the film *212 The Power of Love* (2018) differently from other religious themed films. This film takes the background of a real event, namely the Action to Defend Islam Volume III, or also called the Super Peace Action 212 on Friday, December 2, 2016 which aims to urge the government to imprison the Governor of DKI Basuki "Ahok" Tjahaja Purnama. Ahok, considered to have tarnished the religion of Islam, Al-Quran Surah Al-Maidah verse 51. The Defending Islam Action up to the volumes, then became a phenomenon of a religious movement that unites some Muslims into issues that are not merely blasphemy.

The makers assert that *212 The Power of Love* (212) is a film that campaigns for a peaceful Islam—with the aim of reaching the widest possible market. But the setting of the story and the momentum of its birth, the choice of actors, as well as the people behind its production, show that this film intends to take advantage of the euphoria of the mass supporters of Aksi Bela Islam. The promotion and support of public figures is no exception in the period before and after the film is released. The number of participants in the demonstration is considered promising, although the exact number of people who came to Monas to take part in the action has been a matter of debate until now.

The issue of how promising this market niche is, may be as speculative as the image of the film market segment in general. But by measuring the interest of people who are loyal to the action to defend Islam, the filmmaker of *212 The Power of Love* should be suspected of entering into the process of commodifying the Action of Defending Islam 212 to gain profits through the number of viewers. Thus, the research question or formulation of the problem in this research: "How is the commodification of religion in the movie *212 The Power Of Love*?"

Religion Themed Films in Indonesia

Films and religious issues have more than the usual intersection. As a space of expression, artistic product, as well as a propaganda tool, films have long been used to convey various points of view, not least in relation to religion.

The term Islamic film or Islamic film is not easy to define. But maybe we can see it in a simpler way by using the term 'breathing Islam' as used by Hoesterey and Clark (2012) in their research on films with religious themes in Indonesia. For them, films of this genre – very similar to their aesthetic in calligraphy art, religious novels, and music – are said to be 'Islamic in their breath'. Generally, these films seek to articulate a form of aspirational piety that resonates with the anxieties, desires, and frustrations of Indonesia's middle class Muslims. For Hosterey and Clark, the popularity of Islamic film lies in its ability to articulate not what Islam is, but what Islam can and should be. Islamic films provide models of Muslim normative piety and modernity, the meaning of which is not given, but is conceived and contested on the public stage along fault lines of religious affiliation and political participation. However, character and controversy do not always match the familiar dichotomies of religion and secular, traditionalist and modernist, or Sufi and Salafi (Hoesterey and Clark, 2012: 208)

Historically, the relationship between films and religious issues is almost as old as the film itself (Imanjaya, 2019: 3). Quoting DW Griffith (1915), Imanjaya described *The Birth of a Nation* as controversial because—spoiler alert—sided with the Ku Klux Klan racist group based on religion and demeaned African-Americans. Despite selling well, the film was banned in major cities such as Los

Angeles and Chicago. In 2014 (2019: 4), there were at least two Old Testament versions of prophet stories that were filmed on a super-expensive budget. Noah (Prophet Noah, played by Russell Crowe) by Darren Aronofski (director of *Black Swan*) and Exodus by Sir Ridley Scott (director of *Kingdom of Heaven* and *Black Hawk Down*) about the story of Prophet Musa, played by Christian Bale. The Indonesian audience, Imanjaya notes, knew—and even became a mandatory spectacle for campus da'wah activists in the 1980s and 1990s—Ar-Risalah or *The Massage* (1977) by Musthopa Akkad. Another film is the biopic of Prophet Muhammad SAW by Iranian director Majid Majidi who is also known through the film *Children of Haven* (1977).

Meanwhile, domestically produced films with religious themes were started by, among others, Asrul Sani through *Titian Serambut di Belah Tujuh* (1959), *Tauhid* (1964), *Para Pioneers of Independence* (1977). As a screenwriter, Asrul also gave birth to *Al Kautsar* (1977), and *Nada and Da'wah* (1991). Post-Soeharto, films with religious themes were marked by, among other things, the appearance of *Ayat-ayat Cinta* (2008) by Hanung Bramantyo, followed by *Women with the Turban Dress* (2009) and *Sang Enlightenment* in 2010 (Imanjaya, 2019: 4).

Are films with religious themes in Indonesia a product of Islamization or commodification? Sasono's writing (2011), interestingly maps out its development from the New Order era to the Reformation era and beyond. According to him, the commodification of religion was not a concern for Muslims during the New Order era. Their general attention turned to government institutions and the development of the state. Muslim figures and various forms of Islamic themes in Indonesian films during the New Order era were filled with development discourses. There are always attempts to link various socio-political issues in the depiction of Muslims and Islamic teachings in films in this era. The issues are almost always related to resistance against the Dutch colonialists, helping the poor, supporting nationalism and bringing rational and modern thinking to the general public (Sasono, 2011: 60).

In addition to the Orde Baru political landscape, which almost did not allow other stresses to emerge outside of that issue, socially, the national film market was also just growing with a spirit that supported the rise of Indonesia as a nation state. Asrul Sani's films to *Cut Nyak Dhien* (Eros Djarot, 1988), generally represent this spirit. However, noted Sasono, the New Order also presented a film depiction that represented the growth of a “new devout Muslim middle class” resulting from acceptance of development. The hacker in the representation of Muslims and this new consumption pattern is *Notes Si Boy* (Nasri Cheppy, 1989). The film's main character, Si Boy, is “the perfect vehicle for consumption culture” (cited Sasono from Sen & Hill, 2000). Boy is a picture of a slang figure in his time who still shows obedience as a Muslim. Although of course, the obedience in question is represented only in symbolic forms—such as prayer beads in a car—and private worship (shown in the prayer scene).

Aksi Bela Islam

The Defending Islam action was triggered by resistance to the leaders of DKI Jakarta, which for the first time manifested itself in an 'almost complete' minority figure—non-Muslim, of Chinese descent—Basuki Tjahaja Purnama or Ahok. This resistance found its momentum when Ahok made a statement regarding the Qur'an, surah al-Maidah verse 51.

During a working visit to Pramuka Island, Thousand Islands (27 September 2016), the Governor of the Special Capital Region (DKI) Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama or Ahok, conducted a review and briefing regarding the grouper cultivation empowerment program. Ahok assured residents that the program would continue even though he might not be elected as governor in the February 2017 DKI Jakarta gubernatorial election. This activity was uploaded through the DKI Jakarta provincial government's Youtube account. A netizen, Buni Yani uploaded a video quote entitled *Blasphemy Against Religion?* on his Facebook page by emphasizing statements related to the number of people who lie to the people using religion, especially Al Maidah verse 51.

Responding to the uproar after Buni Yani's upload, Ahok apologized to the public, especially Muslims. But the wave of protests did not stop. Then came the National Movement to Guard the Fatwa of the Indonesian Ulema Council (GNPF MUI) which continued to voice calls to try Ahok as a religious blasphemer. A series of actions which were later referred to as the Defending Islam Action began to emerge. On October 14, 2016, thousands of Islamic organizations led by the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) staged a demonstration in front of the DKI Jakarta City Hall. This was followed by the next action, in early November 2016, which was titled the 411 Peaceful Action. The

government responded to this action and asked the police to immediately process the Ahok case legally. On November 16, 2016, the police named Ahok as a suspect in the blasphemy case. But the action isn't over yet. The Third Defending Islam Action, known as Action 212, emerged. The National Movement to Guard the Fatwa of the Indonesian Ulema Council (GNPF MUI) demanded that Ahok be imprisoned. According to the official GNPF-MUI release, the number of people attending Monas ranges from 6-7 million people.

As stated by Fuadi (2018), this action was then held again in volumes with issues surrounding Ahok and often extended to other issues. Action 112 or also known as the February 11 Action and the Action to Defend Islam IV were a peaceful follow-up to the Actions for Defending Islam I, II, and III. This action was coordinated by the Islamic Community Forum (FUI) and the National Movement to Guard the Fatwa of the Indonesian Ulema Council (GNPF-MUI). The Defending Islam V Action on February 21 2017, took place in the Senayan House of Representatives, Central Jakarta with the demands: 1) Requesting the DPR/MPR to send a letter to the President of the Republic of Indonesia, Joko Widodo regarding the deactivation of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama alias Ahok. 2) The Governor of DKI Jakarta is deemed unfit to remain in the position of a person with the status of a defendant in a case of alleged blasphemy. 3) Ask law enforcement officers not to criminalize scholars and students, and ask law enforcement officers to arrest Ahok. The Defend Islam Action VI, March 31, or Action 313, was a long march from the Istiqlal Mosque to the Merdeka Palace with the aim of asking President Joko Widodo to remove Basuki Tjahaja Purnama alias Ahok from his position as Governor of the Special Capital Region of Jakarta. The Action to Defend Islam VII was named the National Movement to Guard the MUI Fatwa on May 5, 2017 when Ahok was in court. Of course, it was intended to pressure the court to sentence Ahok to the fullest. In the end, Ahok was indeed imprisoned. The election for the Governor of DKI ended with Anis Baswedan's victory, which many people considered could not be separated from the mobilization of religious issues which was also widely voiced in these actions. Later, the series of actions continued to be kept in 'fire' with the events of 'Reunion 212' or the use of other momentums to show the solid bond between the participants of the action.

Many studies have been conducted to look at the Action to Defend Islam, especially volume 212. Some say that this action is nothing more than a political mobilization of certain groups in the name of religion. But some see it as a movement of Islamic activists who want changes in the structure and political movements, especially in social leadership. Are these actions purely as a means of expression for some Muslims who feel the need to criticize power—especially when it involves insulting their beliefs—or in the end they end up as vehicles for certain political elites to gain power? Can these movements be seen as expressions of the da'wah movement, or simply instant political movements that take advantage of the emotions of the people in various ways? Do these actions to defend Islam show a proportional form of solidarity and concern for Islam, or are they simply 'foam' which is the fruit of the political work of certain circles by using religion? Can these actions be read as religious (Islamic) movements that have a solid footing and have a future, or are they simply a reflection of the superficiality of certain views that are forced to interfere with the democratic process? So how far does the media describe these actions? It is around this that questions about the Action to Defend Islam continue to resonate (see for example, Pamungkas and Oktaviani, 2017; Masduki, 2018; Fiorentina et al., 2018; Pradipta et al., 2018; Solikhin, 2018; Ahmadi F and Mahardika, 2019).

2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study uses a critical paradigm. Critical paradigm is a critical process in social science by exploring reality to dismantle the real structure in the material world to help people change their conditions and build a better world for themselves (Neuman, 2006: 95). The type of critical research approach used is explanatory critique. Explanatory critique is a study to think about and understand social life which has practical, moral, and political implications for social conditions to help enlighten and emancipate society (Neuman, 2006: 99). The data collection technique used is documentation. Documentation is a collection of documents consisting of words and images that have been recorded, available in the form of writing, notes, sound, images, or digitally (Daymon and Holloway, 2008: 344). The data analysis technique used thematic analysis. Thematic analysis is an interpretation based on the conception of the actual communication episode.

3 RESULT

a. 212 The Power Of Love in Media Records

The film 212 The Power Of Love premiered in theaters on May 9 2018, produced by Helvy Tiana Rosa and Jastis Arimba and Jastis himself acted as director. While the players include Fauzi Baadila, Adhin Abdul Hakim, Meyda Safira, Hamas Syahid to Ustadz Ercik Yusuf. According to serambinews.com records (9 May 2018), this is Oki Setiana Dewi's first film as an Executive Producer (PE).

This film is about a journalist—a Harvard University graduate—who has a different view on the controversy over the issue of blasphemy and thinks that the Action to Defend Islam is not a productive way. Yes, this film does take the background of a real event, namely the Action to Defend Islam volume III, or also called the Super Peace Action 212 which took place on Friday, December 2, 2016. This action is a series of mass protests and demonstrations aimed at being a continuation of the Defending Islam Action. volume 2 on November 4, 2016 which has the main objective of imprisoning Basuki Tjahaja Purnama or Ahok because it is considered blasphemy against religion, especially against the Koran Al-Maidah verse 51.

Efforts to 'frame' the information of the film 212 The Power of Love as a film that is free of political content, have been intensively carried out by all parties involved. Jastis Arimba, the director, called it a film that spreads a message of peace (republika.co.id). Jastis said, this film is based on facts and data when the phenomenal events of 212 action took place. However, there is a storyline with fictional characterizations inspired and adapting emotional and touching stories during the peaceful protest. "This film talks about the power of love, love in the relationship between one human being and another, as well as the love between humans and the Creator," he said. As a PE, Oki Setiana Dewi stated that this film is purely a work of art and da'wah, without any political content.

Asma Nadia, Associate Producer of 212 The Power of Love mentioned 3 benefits of watching this film (republika.co.id, 30 April 2018). "Some friends who are non-Muslims asked what it means or benefits for them if they watch the movie 212 The Power of Love. I answered at least, there are three things. First, this film is humanist, strengthening the meaning of family. The bond between parents and children, values that relate to people of any religion," said Asma, who is also the sister of the producer of this film, Helvy Tiana Rosa.

The second benefit, he said, is that this film is a symbol for peace and unity, not only for Muslims, but also for the Indonesian nation as a whole. And thirdly, this film also becomes an autocritic for Muslims not to take the law into their own hands.

Another note about this film is the full support shown by political actors who are opposed to Jokowi and Basuki 'Ahok'. Prabowo Subianto, General Chair of the Gerindra Party and Indonesian Presidential Candidate in the 2019 Presidential Election, requires his cadres to watch this film together (www.viva.co.id, 8 May 2018). After watching it, Prabowo considered that this film had succeeded in telling how Islam is a religion of peace and upholds unity. Not to forget, he obliges all Gerindra Party cadres to show up or watch together in various cities.

No matter how the film is campaigned, after its release, there are many critical notes that see 212 The Power of Love cannot be read only as a film with a message of peace, or free of political content. A young writer, Shandy Gasella explained that this film is a reconstruction of winning-style propaganda (kumparan.com). According to him, the context of the real events behind the story of the film 212 The Power of Love is obscured and replaced by another completely abstract context. "In the film we are forced to believe that the Muslims who march to Monas are based on one goal and not another, namely love... I don't know what love is; religion, scholars, politics(us)," he wrote.

According to this writer, 212 The Power of Love shows a lot of dialogue and scenes that lose social context. He compared it to Searching for the Hilal "which was played by the figures of Father-Son Heli (Oka Antara) and Mahmud (Deddi Sutomo) through a capable production, equipped with scripts written by Salman Aristo, Bagus Bramanti and Ismail Basbeth, the scenes in which the interactions between the two were very rich. dialogue that provides an understanding of the character of each character, what is in his head, what is in his heart, poured out in dialogue and gestures as well as in other picture language. The social context in which the two characters live also emerges, giving color and complementing the film's story so that the beliefs presented are representative of the real

situation in society. Jastis Arimba is not that smart in packaging this film. Far away, like Earth and Planet Namek.”

Another writer, Windu Jusuf (tirto.id), describes this film as too much in blurring the context, including dialogues that misunderstand Karl Marx's thoughts on religion. Jusuf's other note that is not less important is that this film tries to neutralize hatred or hate speech that actually, in fact, appears a lot in the Action to Defend Islam in all its volumes. The film did try to show violent scenes from a group of action participants which was then prevented by other action participants. Director Jastis Arimba, for example, tucked a scene (from a true story) of a Christian couple's wedding at the Cathedral Church located around Monas. Demonstrators were shown paving the way for the couple once they left the church. Jastis also added the sequence of Ki Zainal's conversation with his close friend, a meatball seller who happens to be of Chinese ethnicity. But only to that extent. Speeches and utterances that exploit religious sentiment in electoral politics clearly do not appear. In fact, it is an issue that is considered by many to be very disturbing from these actions in the real world.

“In the Power of Love universe, anyone who criticizes and opposes the 212 movement—or the practice of politicizing religion in general during the Jakarta gubernatorial election—is not Chinese, not Christian, not non-Muslim, but readers of Karl Marx and secular people with traumatic pasts. Thus, criticisms of the 212 movement—and consequently, oppressive and discriminatory religious interpretations and practices—will not be viewed as departing from deep study and reflection on the relationship between religion and politics, but rather from the critic's feelings of envy,” (Yusuf, coil.com, May 13, 2018).

More or less the same criticism, also written by Fidhia Kemala in www.whiteboardjournal.com. For Kemala, 212 The Power of Love clearly presents facts about the act of defending Islam, but it is also as clear that she hides others to wrap the campaign as a film that spreads peace, or depicts Islam and peaceful acts of defending Islam.

In addition, there are many notes related to this film from a technical aspect. One of them, published in idntimes.com where a writer describes 7 oddities in the film 212 The Power of Love. This discrepancy regarding a number of scenes, sound production, cinematography, until the appearance of a cameo feels 'weird'. At the end of the story, this film does feature celebrities who are known to young audiences and have been supporting the Islamic Defense Action such as Tommy Kurniawan, Irfan Hakim, Arie Untung and several other actors.

Critics and notes on 212 The Power of Love seem to indicate that this film is technically and aesthetically problematic. However, these criticisms cannot be viewed as a negative response from those who reject the Action to Defend Islam. Because these critical notes—in general—their logic and rationality can be measured as far as film is concerned as a work of art and culture. The technical and aesthetic flaws of this film make it seem as if the film was made in a hurry—to simply put aside the alleged lack of competence of the makers—in order to catch up with the momentum.

b. Content Commodification and Audience Commodification 212 The Power of Love

According to records from www.tabloidstar.com (9 May 2018), 212 The Power of Love was watched by 75 thousand people on its premiere Wednesday (9/5) throughout Indonesia. Even though it was only shown in a few cinemas in Jakarta, this film received an extraordinary response in various regions. Another media, beritainspiratif.com (May 19, 2018) wrote that this film was included in the 15 highest-grossing films based on data from filmindonesia.or.id. At least, this data appears as of Monday (14/5/2018), where 212 The Power Of Love is in 13th place with a total audience of 273,711 people.

Color Pictures' premiere film is claimed not to rely on any sponsors. The reason is to avoid frills that associate films with certain motifs. With the setting of the Ciamis area and a number of other areas, plus footage from the 212 mass action, the film 212 The Power of Love was completed in about one month. There is no information about how much it will cost to complete this film. But reaching an audience of nearly 300 thousand, or in the filmmaker's own claim as much as 720 thousand - still seems to be a strong motive for producers and people behind the scenes to continue the "success" of this film. It is proven, in 2019 the continuation of this film, *Hayya, The Power of Love 2*. *Hayya The Power Of Love 2* was reported to have won 415 thousand viewers (liputan6.com, 24 September 2019). Not if in 2020, *Hayya 2*. has also been prepared.

When political economists think about commodity forms of communication, they tend to start with media content. In particular, from this point of view, the commodification process in

communication involves the transformation of messages, from bits of data to meaningful systems of thought, into marketable products (Mosco, 2009: 133). This is what Mosco calls content commodification. Simply put, filmmakers present stories that suit their interests, both ideologically and economically.

As described above, 212 The Power of Love as fiction is adapted from the true story of the Action to Defend Islam event, not showing loyalty to the event itself based on an objective and open point of view. As campaigned by the makers, this film depicts love, showing Islam in its peaceful face. While researchers and media reports show, the mass action aimed at imprisoning Ahok is an action with a 'face' that does not really describe a peaceful 'face'. Even the goals themselves are considered by many to be too simplistic and hide political agendas behind 'in the name' of defending religion. Except for a lot of hate speeches, the series of mass actions have also taken and developed issues beyond just enforcing the law against Ahok. Even then, it can be easily read as an effort to lead the Governor Candidate Anies Baswedan to win the contest in DKI Jakarta. After that, the action was still accompanied by political targets to win Prabowo Subianto against Jokowi Widodo in the 2019 presidential election.

212 The Power of Love tries to avoid the political context that develops and revolves around the Action to Defend Islam III through layered modes. Of course, this starts with storytelling and involving actors or film players. In terms of story, this film evades accusations of politicization of religion at the mass action at Monas, and tries to eliminate the view that in this action there are 'strangers' of democracy who are ideologically oriented towards establishing an Islamic caliphate. Crucial aspects related to the action of 212 appear vaguely in the film, and 212 The Power of Love tries to emphasize the story of the father-son conflict of Kiai Zainal (Humaidi Abbas) Rahmat (Fauzi Baadila). The father is a conservative local cleric, while the son is an American-educated journalist who has long been skeptical of Islam. Even tend to be atheist.

What is the main agenda of the Action to Defend Islam? How is this mass action going? What kind of action agendas are campaigned through religious forums, including mosques? How far is the picture of the pros and cons of action in rational discussions and debates in the media? Some of the questions related to the action of 212 cannot be found in the content of the film 212 The Power of Love.

The unclear reference to Action 212—but at the same time using the title—then seems to be a 'tool' for producers, executive producers, directors and players to campaign for this film as a film with a message of peace. Another thing that was repeatedly conveyed through the media was related to the scene—which was taken from a true story of the action—when a group of participants escorted a couple of non-Muslim brides who were about to perform a blessing on the day of the action. Do not forget to include an emphasis that this film also involves non-Muslim actors. But the problem is, the number of Muslim actors remains dominant and ironically also, the actors featured, including cameos, are those who have been known politically for often voicing their support for the defense of Islam. Fauzi Baadilla, even known to be active on social media campaigning for Prabowo Subianto in the 2019 presidential election.

At this point, the film 212 actually fails to avoid the common sense that it was born out of a desire to perpetuate the spirit of 212 which, although difficult to formulate, can be seen as trying to strengthen the emotional bonds of Muslim constituents to make political choices for certain candidates. After 'feeling' successful in the DKI Jakarta Pilkada, this spirit seems to be used for the 2019 Presidential Election. Apolitical, but partial.

Thus, in order to gain sympathy and invite audiences in large numbers and not limited to certain groups, in terms of content, 212 The Power of Love did several ways. First, it seeks to explore the father-son relationship and avoid in-depth debates related to the issue which is the source of the emergence of mass actions in the name of defending Islam. Second, choosing the events in the mass action that are considered to be in accordance with the economic objectives of the film—attaining audiences from various circles—and avoiding other events. Here, the film shows the ambiguity of the makers and the actors. They seem to disagree that the act of defending Islam is colored with insults and hate speech, because it then describes the part that is considered peaceful Islam in the film. In fact, in reality, we can easily find the facts that these actions were often colored (at least) by verbal violence against parties considered to be opposites.

From the calculation of the potential audience, this film should have succeeded in commodifying its audience. Let's say the achievement of 700 thousand viewers of 212 The Power of Love—as claimed by the producer—can be accounted for, this number is still far from expectations (seword.com, May 24, 2018). This film is inspired by a real event, namely the grand demonstration on December 2, 2016 which was claimed to have been carried out by 7 million people. Only half the number of viewers from that, will make this film listed as one of the highest-grossing films in Indonesia. Especially if it is added to Prabowo Subianto's order for Gerindra cadres to watch together. But as with the #putihkanbioskop campaign and the jargon of 'films for alumni 212', Prabowo's order did not bring any encouraging results for the film 212 side.

However, it is clear that the calculation of the number of viewers is the commodifiable motive of filmmakers from the start. This motif is evident in the use of the title, and of course, the setting of the story that is displayed. Another fact is that this film does involve—behind or in front of the screen—figures who are known to show themselves as part of the Action to Defend Islam. The people behind and in front of the screen, plus the political actors who endorse this film, are those who cannot be separated from certain political affiliations. Thus the relationship between the parties in the emergence of this film, as well as its sequels and prequels later, underscores the strong ideological and economic motives that are hard to deny.

4 CONCLUSION

The commodification of religion in 212 The Power of Love is manifested: Commodification of content, namely with messages of action to defend Islam, action 212, supporting cast of action to defend Islam. Commodification of the audience, as the target audience for 212 alumni, Gerindra cadres, Prabowo supporters.

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